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Abstract
This article contests Sean McMeekin’s claims concerning Russian culpability for the First World 
War. McMeekin maintains that Ottoman rearmament, particularly the purchase of several 
battleships released onto the global arms market by South American states, threatened to create 
a situation where the Russian Black Sea Fleet would be outclassed by its Ottoman opposite 
number. Rather than waiting for this to happen, the tsarist regime chose to go to war. Yet, 
contrary to McMeekin’s claims, the Ottoman naval expansion never assumed threatening 
dimensions because the Porte was unable to purchase battleships from Chile or Argentina. As a 
result, it provided no incentive for Russia to go to war in 1914.
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In a new and controversial analysis of Russia’s role in the origins of the First World War, 
Sean McMeekin has recently argued that one of the key triggers for the conflict that 
engulfed Europe in 1914 – if not, in fact, the most significant – was the Russian desire to 
dismember the Ottoman Empire.1 Among many choice items on the Russian list of objec-
tives to be secured from such a ‘war of the Ottoman Succession’, none was more 
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important in motivating the regime in St Petersburg than the prospect of gaining control 
over the straits constricting unfettered access from the Russian ports on the Black Sea to 
the open waters of the Mediterranean. According to McMeekin, this objective lay at the 
heart of tsarist policy: it was the outcome that Russian statesmen strove tirelessly to 
achieve and explains why the Russian government, aware that this could not be acquired 
by peaceful means, was so eager to provoke a war that would allow them to realize by 
violent action that which they could not attain by diplomacy. It is McMeekin’s conten-
tion that in 1914 the Russian government was finally able to provoke the showdown 
designed to facilitate this goal. Thus, in his view, the conflict that broke out that year had 
less to do with protecting Serbia, preserving the position of the so-called ‘Triple Entente’ 
in the face of German expansionism, or maintaining the balance of power in Europe than 
it had with the achievement of this one specific long-term Russian territorial and geopo-
litical aspiration.
The capture of Constantinople had, of course, long been a goal of successive Russian 
governments and this aim could hardly have been described as a secret one. Other pow-
ers knew of this aspiration – indeed, as the Crimean War vividly illustrates, they had 
previously combined together to resist it – and, consequently, the Russian government 
had shown itself willing, in the past, to play a long waiting game in the furtherance of this 
goal. On the face of it, nothing had changed in 1914 to make waiting a less sensible or 
less attractive policy. Indeed, at that juncture, there were many good reasons to eschew 
war and maintain such a policy of patience. Most important of all, in the then competitive 
world of relative armed strength engendered by the ongoing European land armaments 
race, Russia had everything to gain by delaying conflict. The reason for this was that 
while the huge German Army Bills of 1912 and 1913 were already beginning to have 
some effect, the recently initiated Russian great military expansion programme would 
not bear fruit until 1917. Hence, in terms of relative armed strength, 1914 was a year in 
which the balance of power favoured Russia’s enemies. All of this leads to one obvious 
and inevitable question: even if one accepts that Russia sought control of the Straits, why 
would it choose 1914 as the moment for starting a war for this purpose?
McMeekin anticipates this question and provides more than one answer, framing an 
analysis of Russian thinking that involves several layers of calculation. One of the most 
crucial aspects of this, however, relates to the Russians’ apparent belief that they were 
being outmanoeuvred politically, diplomatically, and, most significantly, militarily in the 
crucial Black Sea arena. Following the disastrous wars of 1911 against Italy and then of 
1912 and 1913 against the Balkan states, ‘the Turks were arming themselves to the 
teeth’2 to an extent that threatened to neutralize Russia’s ability to project sufficient 
power in the region to realize its goal of seizing the Straits. A particularly threatening 
aspect of the Ottoman arms build-up was their naval expansion. A British naval mission 
had been based in the Porte since 1908, with the ostensible purpose of modernizing the 
antiquated and inefficient Ottoman navy. Moreover, the British were also selling to the 
Ottoman Empire modern dreadnought battleships. Two such state-of-the art vessels of 
the Reshadieh class had been ordered from Vickers and Armstrong respectively in 1911.3 
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While the second vessel was subsequently cancelled owing to severe budgetary prob-
lems at the Porte, once Turkish finances had improved, as was evident by 1913, the 
Ottoman government was able to reconstitute its building programme by taking over the 
contract for the Rio de Janeiro, a battleship originally ordered by Brazil but no longer 
wanted by that power. With the purchase of this vessel, renamed the Sultan Osman I, the 
Ottoman government once again had two new battleships under contract.
Could this really have pushed St Petersburg towards war? As the Porte had placed its 
first dreadnought order with Vickers in 1911, the building of this vessel can hardly have 
come as a sudden surprise to the Russian government in 1914; it had responded with the 
obvious countermeasure of laying down three such vessels itself.4 Equally, the substitu-
tion of the Sultan Osman I for the second vessel of the Reshadieh class merely restored 
to two warships a purchasing programme that had originally stood at two warships – no 
doubt a disappointment for St Petersburg, especially if it had basked contentedly in the 
fleeting reduction of the Ottoman order of battle to a single unit, but hardly a great upset. 
Clearly, therefore, this alone would not have tipped Russia into waging war.5 What 
apparently caused such consternation among the tsar’s ministers that at the start of 1914 
imminent belligerency suddenly became the preferred option was a much more radical 
change in the future prospects of the Ottoman navy. It is McMeekin’s contention that, 
despite having only two battleships in the offing at the end of 1913, ‘by January 1914 
Turkey had no less than five imported dreadnoughts on order’.6 These consisted of the 
two vessels already mentioned above plus a further three units that had been purchased 
prior to their completion from two governments in South America that no longer desired 
them. They were the Almirante Latorre, which had been laid down in December 1911 at 
Armstrong’s yard for Chile, and the Moreno and Rivadavia,7 which were then building 
in the United States for Argentina.
In McMeekin’s estimation it was this massive spurt in the Ottoman accumulation of 
naval assets, an accumulation which threatened to change the power dynamic in the 
Black Sea in a manner not previously anticipated in St Petersburg, which forced Russia 
to act so decisively in 1914. A force of five modern dreadnoughts would utterly outclass 
the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which then comprised only elderly and obsolete pre- 
dreadnought battleships. Even when the Russian navy completed its ongoing Black Sea 
modernization programme – which consisted of three new dreadnought battleships, 
which were due to start coming into service in 1915 – the new Turkish force would enjoy 
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a marked superiority in numbers. More worrying still, according to McMeekin, it would 
also be superior in quality. As he explains: ‘because the Turks’ three state-of-the-art 
British ships all mounted thirteen-and-a-half inch guns – the Sultan Osman I would 
mount more guns than any ship ever afloat – they would greatly outclass the Russian 
ships’ twelve-inch guns’.8 This combination of quantitative and qualitative superiority 
was a development the implementation of which was not to be countenanced and led 
directly to secret Russian war planning.
In the face of the game-changing Turkish armaments acquisitions revealed in January 
1914, an important ‘special conference’ was held by senior members of the Russian mili-
tary and civilian leadership on 8/21 February 1914 to hammer out a response.9 But what 
could Russia do? The first and most obvious option was for St Petersburg to approach 
Britain, the builder of three of these vessels and Russia’s nominal partner in the Triple 
Entente, air its concerns, and seek a remedy. According to McMeekin, the attempt to gain 
redress through this process, if anything, made matters worse because of what McMeekin 
evidently sees as Britain’s evasive, not to say highly disingenuous, diplomatic stance. 
Initial conversations undertaken with the British embassy in St Petersburg got nowhere 
because, as McMeekin notes with undisguised incredulity, Sir George Buchanan, the 
ambassador, responded to all Russian representations ‘in apparent ignorance that the 
warships in question were in fact under contract to Turkey’.10 Subsequent Russian diplo-
macy in London fared no better: the British government, after choosing some flimsy 
pretext not to answer Russian inquiries for many months, eventually claimed to be pow-
erless to interfere in what was characterized as a private business matter. McMeekin’s 
view of this ‘British blow-off’, as he calls it, is clear. In his analogy, it would be as if 
during the Cold War Britain had sought an alliance with the United States and, at the 
same time, also undertaken to sell nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union and advised 
America’s main enemy on how best to use them.11 It was ‘Perfidious Albion’ at its worst.
As a result, with all practical redress from Britain unobtainable, it is hardly to be 
wondered that Russia found 1914 an attractive moment for resorting to war. It was the 
tsarist regime’s only opportunity to attain its goal before the Turkish navy became too 
powerful to deal with and the long-sought dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire 
became an impossible dream.
McMeekin’s book has received many complimentary reviews, and within several of 
these the importance has been especially highlighted of the five Ottoman dreadnoughts 
as a new and convincing evidential factor in the attempt to place greater emphasis on the 
Russian part in the origins of the First World War.12 And, yet, for all that, it is a 
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remarkable fact that McMeekin advances no documentary or historical authorities for 
many key aspects of his five Ottoman dreadnought argument. Among the claims that 
remain unsupported are the assertion that the battleships building for the Porte were 
superior to and would inevitably overpower the Russian dreadnoughts under construc-
tion in the Black Sea, the contention that Turkey had purchased three additional dread-
noughts in January 1914 over and above the two that had previously formed the core of 
its expansion, and the characterization of British diplomacy in response to Russian 
requests for aid in this matter as deliberately obtuse and obstructive. As will be suggested 
below, this lack of documentary or historiographical grounding is a major shortcoming, 
because each and every one of these points is open to serious objection not just on inter-
pretative grounds, where historians can, of course, legitimately differ, but also on factual 
grounds, where such differences are of more questionable legitimacy.
Let us first consider McMeekin’s claim about the superior quality of the ships under 
construction by British firms for the Ottoman navy as compared with those being built 
by the Russians in their own yards for their Black Sea Fleet. This contention is based 
exclusively upon the premise that, because the vessels being built in Britain mounted a 
main battery composed of larger calibre guns (expressed in terms of the barrel’s bore 
diameter) than those under construction in Russia, they were consequently more power-
ful ships. As noted above, McMeekin asserts the larger calibre guns of the Turks’ British-
built ships would have greatly outclassed those of the Russian ships.13 The force behind 
this argument is clear enough: mounting heavier ordnance makes for a more powerful 
ship. While there is certainly a clear logic in operation here, the argument is not the 
incontestable truism that it might seem, as there is, in fact, no absolute correlation 
between the fighting power of a warship and the calibre of its guns. One of the compli-
cating realities of naval architecture is that all warship design is a compromise. On any 
given displacement the designers of a man-of-war have to balance the weight devoted to 
armament against that apportioned to protection and that assigned to propulsion. In this 
zero-sum game, more or bigger guns can only be obtained at the expense of less armour 
or smaller engines. Thus, they come at a cost, be that cost expressed in lower speed or 
greater vulnerability. In that context, the decision to emphasize offensive capability, even 
if purchased at the expense of weaker defensive capabilities, is one that many warship 
designers have made and can be a good trade-off, but this is certainly not always the case.
The battle of Jutland provides several examples of heavily armed but weakly armoured 
British vessels that were destroyed in combat by more heavily protected German war-
ships mounting smaller guns. The 12-inch-gunned HMS Indefatigable, for example, 
which was battered to pieces in half an hour by the 11-inch-gunned Von Der Tann is a 
case in point. Clearly, the German vessel was not ‘greatly outclassed’ despite its lighter 
ordnance. In a similar way, the 57 officers and 1209 ratings who perished when HMS 
Queen Mary, which mounted 13.5-inch artillery, lost its gunnery duel with the German 
battlecruiser Derfflinger, armed with 12-inch guns, also serve as unwilling testament to 
the fact that heavier weaponry is a design choice but not one that in and of itself provides 
a guarantee of battlefield superiority.
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This painfully acquired point was not lost on the Royal Navy. In the aftermath of 
Jutland, one of the lessons scrupulously applied to British battleship design was that 
protection and survivability were at least as important as raw hitting power, if not actu-
ally more so. Nothing is more telling in this respect than the fact that Admiral Sir Ernle 
(later Lord) Chatfield, who as captain of the battlecruiser Lion at Jutland had witnessed 
the explosion of a succession of poorly armoured British battlecruisers, and whose own 
ship had only narrowly escaped a similar fate, ‘was determined’, once he became First 
Sea Lord, ‘not to build … ships that were unbalanced owing to so much weight being put 
into guns that they would have too little protective armour’.14 As a result, the King 
George V class, the battleships whose construction he oversaw, were heavily protected, 
but mounted a primary armament smaller in calibre than their foreign contemporaries. 
Clearly, he did not believe that gun-power alone was the decisive factor.
However, even were it valid to assert, as McMeekin does, that heavier ordnance con-
ferred a definite and unqualified advantage, it would still not be possible to conclude that 
all of Turkey’s British-built dreadnoughts outclassed their Russian counterparts. The rea-
son for this is that, contrary to what McMeekin claims, not all the battleships being built 
in Britain for the Turkish navy mounted 13.5 inch guns. Indeed, somewhat ironically, the 
Sultan Osman I, the one vessel specifically named by McMeekin as an illustration of this 
supposed Turkish ordnance superiority, actually shipped a primary armament that was 
entirely composed of 12 inch guns, the very same calibre of weaponry that was mounted 
on Russia’s putative Black Sea dreadnoughts.15 If the Sultan Osman I was a superior 
vessel – in fact, a very doubtful proposition given its great length and weak main armour 
belt – this superiority certainly did not come from any advantage in the calibre of its main 
battery armament. Factually, therefore, this assertion of qualitative superiority is a highly 
doubtful one.
If the claims about the qualitative superiority of the Ottoman navy’s dreadnoughts 
over their Russian counterparts do not entirely stand up to scrutiny, even less viable is the 
assertion of their numerical superiority. It will be recalled that McMeekin maintains that 
in contrast to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which had three battleships under construc-
tion, ‘by January 1914 Turkey had no less than five imported dreadnoughts on order’.16 
The basis on which this claim is made is never actually specified. This is significant 
because the assertion that there were five battleships being built for Turkey cannot be 
reconciled with any of the obvious sources.17 These suggest that in January 1914 the 
Ottoman Empire had on the books exactly the same number of dreadnoughts that it had 
had on order in December 1913, namely two. These were the Reshadieh and the Sultan 
Osman I. As will be shown, neither the Argentine nor the Chilean dreadnoughts 
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mentioned by McMeekin had been purchased by the Porte in January 1914, nor would 
they be purchased by Turkey in the following months.
The saga of the Argentine dreadnoughts Rivadavia and Moreno, although a complex 
one, is the easier of the two to tell as its various twists and turns have already been cata-
logued with great clarity and precision by Seward Livermore in an article published 
some seven decades ago. Helpfully, the story has also subsequently been augmented with 
additional materials in important works by William Kaldis and Paul Halpern.18 
Collectively, these accounts not only analyse the Argentine decision to order these ves-
sels – they were procured as part of a South American arms race triggered by an ill-
advised Brazilian naval expansion programme19 – but also provide considerable detail 
concerning the doubts that arose in Argentina about the purchase once the initial jingo-
ism that had inspired their acquisition had worn off and the long-term financial implica-
tions of commissioning two of the largest type of warships became increasingly apparent. 
By 1913, rumours abounded that the government wished to dispose of these battleships, 
and it was said that both Greece and Russia had made offers for them. Nevertheless, 
although there was a groundswell of opinion in the Argentine legislature that one of these 
offers should be accepted and the financial burden of these vessels passed on to some 
other misguided country, this did not occur. One reason for this was that the two dread-
noughts embodied some of the latest features of American naval technology, including 
ordnance and mechanical devices then in service with the United States Navy. While the 
American government was not troubled at the prospect of these materials being used by 
Argentina, a country within its sphere of influence, it was not at all eager for these instal-
lations to fall into the hands of possible future naval rivals in Europe or Japan. Accordingly, 
the American government put considerable pressure on Buenos Aires not to sell the war-
ships. This proved successful. Although three bills promoting such a sale were intro-
duced into the Argentine chamber of deputies in May 1914, none were successful, and by 
the end of June it was clear that Argentina would complete its purchase of these battle-
ships.20 Accordingly, it was no great surprise to anyone when the vessels finally arrived 
in the River Plate in 1915.
Three points are especially notable from Livermore’s account. First of all, although 
rumours of a possible disposal of the Argentine dreadnoughts were circulating in January 
1914, there was no prospect of an actual sale until May at the very earliest when the 
appropriate bills were put before the Argentine legislature. McMeekin’s suggestion that 
the vessels had already been transferred in January 1914 is, therefore, chronologically 
untenable. Second, had the vessels been sold, there was no reason to suppose that the 
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Ottoman regime would have been the beneficiary. The contract for the vessels specified 
that first refusal went to the United States, a government that, for reasons already stated, 
was not at all eager to see these ships in European hands.21 Yet, even had the Americans 
decided not to exercise their option and thereby sanctioned the disposal, it was most 
unlikely that these battleships would have ended up in Turkey’s possession. Given the 
acute Russian interest in these vessels and the parlous state of the Ottoman finances, 
made worse by Russian efforts to cut Turkey off from sources of foreign credit,22 the 
chances were slim that the Porte would have been able to outbid St Petersburg in any 
competition to take over the contract.23 This was certainly the view of the British govern-
ment, and explains why it was that, when new rumours began to circulate in May 1914 
that the Rivadavia and Moreno would be sold by Argentina, the presumed purchaser was 
not the Ottoman but the Russian government.24 However, none of these considerations 
ever became relevant because, finally and most importantly, there was no sale. Despite 
all the chitchat, the Argentine navy, predictably enough, wanted to keep the vessels, and 
the Argentine government, although mindful about the costs, was similarly inclined. As 
a result, at the conclusion of the sale versus retention debate in the Argentine legislature 
in June 1914, the Moreno and Rivadavia remained firmly in Argentine hands.
A similar situation prevailed in respect of the Chilean battleships. Like Argentina, the 
government in Santiago had ordered its two dreadnoughts – named the Almirante Latorre 
and the Almirante Cochrane – as part of the South American arms race that had been 
prompted by the Brazilian naval expansion. Once again, as was the case with Argentina, 
this was very much a prestige project that the nation could ill afford and, consequently, 
once Brazil disposed of the Rio de Janeiro, rumours were rife that Chile would likewise 
get rid of at least one, if not both, of the battleships it had on order. Reinforcing these 
murmurings, a strong agitation developed in the country supportive of such a sale, the 
prospect of which quickly attracted numerous interested parties. The Porte was undeni-
ably one of these – the British minister was informed that Turkey had made an offer, and 
reported this to London25 – but Greece, alarmed at the Ottoman purchase of the Rio de 
Janeiro, was most decidedly another; and, of course, there was also Russia, whose gov-
ernment explored both the possibility of facilitating a Greek purchase via a French loan 
or, failing that, of buying the vessels itself. However, in the event none of these possible 
outcomes came to pass. The Chilean government soon made it clear that it had no inten-
tion of parting with the ships – although for reasons of cost and the difficulties of finding 
the necessary manpower to crew both vessels simultaneously, the delivery of the 
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Almirante Cochrane was pushed back a year. Moreover, as a concession to its well-
known sensibilities, in January 1914 an assurance was given to Russia, via the builders, 
Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., that on no account would the Almirante Latorre be sold to 
Turkey.26 None of this, however, prevented the Russians pushing Chile to sell them the 
ships instead. In March 1914 Sir Charles Ottley, a former director of Naval Intelligence 
and a senior figure at Armstrong’s, informed the British Foreign Office that his firm, 
which was also the designated agent of the Chilean government, had ‘received a substan-
tial offer from the Russian Government for the purchase of the two Chilean battleships 
under construction at Armstrong’s’.27 Nothing came of this attempt, but failure merely 
prompted further efforts by Russian diplomats in subsequent months to get their hands 
on these ships. They, too, would prove unsuccessful. The reason was straightforward. As 
the Chilean minister in London informed the British Foreign Office in June, this was not 
due to any antipathy towards Russia, but because ‘his Government did not intend to sell 
them’. And to reinforce the point he disclosed the further information that ‘the President 
[of Chile] had declared that, as long as he held office, these ships, which were ordered 
because Chile needed them, would not be sold to any power whatever, unless it were to 
Great Britain’.28 Given this strength of view it is little wonder that, when war broke out 
in August 1914, both these vessels were still owned by Chile, from whose government 
(rather than Turkey) the Royal Navy requisitioned the ships (by special purchase) on its 
entry into the war.29
Once again, as this account shows, there are clear problems both with McMeekin’s 
chronology about a putative sale and with his conclusions about its actual occurrence. 
While it is certainly true that rumours of a possible Chilean disposal of warships were 
circulating in January 1914, this did not equate to an actual sale, McMeekin’s confident 
assertions on this point notwithstanding. Indeed, the fact that Russia was still seeking to 
tempt the government in Santiago to part with its dreadnoughts in March is proof posi-
tive not only that no such transfer had taken place, but, just as significantly, that the 
Russians knew this. After all, had the ships already been sold, Russian negotiations with 
Chile for their acquisition would have been pointless. The idea that Turkey had pur-
chased the Almirante Latorre as early as January can, therefore, be dismissed. So, too, 
can the idea that the Porte ever took over the contract for this vessel, an eventuality that 
the Chilean government had specifically and definitively ruled out. Indeed, somewhat 
ironically given McMeekin’s thesis, if any country came close to acquiring a Chilean 
dreadnought, it was not Turkey but Russia. According to Halpern’s research, Russian 
persistence almost bore fruit in relation to the purchase of the Almirante Cochrane. 
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In June the minister of marine in Santiago, presumably without the sanction of his presi-
dent, momentarily relented in his previously dogged desire to keep it and actually 
approved the sale in principle. Of course, he could not make this decision entirely on his 
own and it was quickly frustrated, not least by the determined opposition of the Chilean 
legation in London.30
The McMeekin thesis that three South American dreadnoughts were purchased by 
Turkey in January 1914 in time for this information to play a decisive part in the Russian 
‘special conference’ of February 1914 is thus factually inaccurate. Of course, it is always 
possible that in January 1914 – and conceivably even in February – the Russian govern-
ment believed the rumours about such a purchase. However, if so, it is evident from its 
own subsequent efforts to purchase the Chilean vessels that by March at the very latest it 
had been disabused of this notion. The political disputes in the Argentine legislature over 
the future of its naval programme would have served the same purpose in clarifying for 
the Russian government the situation regarding that country’s dreadnoughts. 
Consequently, in the immediate run-up to the First World War, fears of a large-scale 
Ottoman naval expansion were not driving Russian policy to war, because the Russian 
government was well aware that the earlier reported rumours on this matter were without 
foundation.
Given that no additional South American dreadnoughts were purchased by Turkey 
either in January 1914 or, indeed, anytime thereafter, the reason for Britain’s diffident 
response to Russia’s diplomatic overtures on the topic of Ottoman naval expansion becomes 
somewhat clearer. Sir George Buchanan reacted ‘in apparent ignorance that the warships in 
question were in fact under contract to Turkey’31 for the simple reason that the ships in 
question were not under contract to Turkey. Similarly, McMeekin’s incredulity that 
Sazonov did not mention South American dreadnoughts when issuing ‘his first formal 
protest, dated 8 May 1914,’32 is now explained: by that time, the Russian minister knew full 
well that these ships had not been acquired by the Porte. The implication of these correc-
tions for McMeekin’s characterization of British diplomacy on this matter is potentially 
significant. Far from being evasive and disingenuous, British diplomats were being quite 
open and honest on the point of Turkish warship purchases. Accordingly, a reassessment of 
this diplomacy in the light of the known facts is required and will be provided below.
Contrary to McMeekin’s provocative conclusion that Britain was deliberately and 
perversely undermining Russia’s position at the Straits, the evidence from the British 
diplomatic and naval archives suggests that this was not the policy of London at all. Far 
from attempting to keep Russia away from the Straits, British diplomatic behaviour was 
actually motivated by the quite different desire of seeing off the strong challenge for 
influence at the Porte then coming from Germany.33 As the Foreign Office’s response to 
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Sazonov’s protest pointed out, the supply of a naval mission to the Ottoman Empire 
allowed the British government to exercise some degree of influence at Constantinople 
and that influence, in shaping Turkish policy, was beneficial to all of the Entente powers, 
Russia included. By contrast, the alternative course of action of refusing to participate in 
the modernization of the Turkish navy would not only have deprived Britain of that influ-
ence, but worse still would have allowed another, possibly unfriendly, power to under-
take that role in Britain’s place, with possibly catastrophic diplomatic consequences. As 
the memorandum forcefully stated:
If His Majesty’s Government had refused the Turkish application it is quite certain that the 
reorganisation of the Turkish navy would have been entrusted to Germany, and His Majesty’s 
Government feel confident that the Russian Government will share their belief that an 
arrangement which might have placed the reorganisation of both the naval and military forces 
of Turkey in the hands of one Power would not have been to the real interest of either Turkey 
or of Great Britain and Russia.34
The British point was well made. In particular, the allusion to the recently dispatched 
German military mission to Turkey would most definitely not have been lost on St 
Petersburg. An alarmed and outraged Russian government had protested in the strongest 
terms when in 1913 a German general, Otto Liman von Sanders, had been appointed to 
command the Ottoman military forces at the Straits.35 It was an increase in German con-
trol that simply could not be countenanced. In the words of Mikhail Giers, the Russian 
ambassador in Constantinople, it did not suit St Petersburg to have Germany as a neigh-
bour in Asia.36 For this reason the British expectation that the prospect of a German 
admiral exercising executive command over Ottoman naval units in Constantinople must 
surely have been equally unwelcome to Russia seems incontestable, especially as this 
could have resulted in both a German admiral and a German general operating in concert 
to cement German influence at this vital strategic point. Consequently, on the matter of 
an expanding German presence in the Ottoman capital and the need to stem it, it can 
safely be assumed that Britain and Russia would have shared similar views, thereby 
making the British reply hard to refute.
Of course, it might be argued that a formal British diplomatic message to the Russian 
government is hardly conclusive proof of London’s real thinking: after all, would not the 
Foreign Office simply tailor its words to the circumstances and provide the Russians 
with the answer most likely to correspond to their particular sensibilities? While there is 
undoubtedly some salience to this putative objection, the secret internal papers of the 
British government reveal that anxiety over the spread of German influence in the 
Ottoman Empire was, in fact, the real driver of British policy regarding their naval 
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mission there and had been for some time. In informing St Petersburg of this fact they 
were revealing both their motives and intent, and doing so in a remarkably open and hon-
est fashion. A few examples will illustrate the depth and influence of British anxiety on 
this point.
In the autumn of 1910 two issues arose in relation to the Turkish navy: first, the 
Ottoman government purchased two obsolete German pre-dreadnought battleships; sec-
ond, the Turks applied to send some of their naval officers to Britain for training with the 
Royal Navy. Both developments had the potential to alter the balance of power in the 
Black Sea and were, therefore, inevitably going to be unappealing to Russia. The British 
government was, naturally, aware of this and, in the case of the Turkish request to have 
some of their officers serve temporarily on British warships, extremely sensitive to the 
possible ramifications for Anglo-Russian relations. For this and other reasons, the Foreign 
Office was far from enthusiastic about the application, with one official presciently minut-
ing the additional objection: ‘I hope we shall not be training officers who will eventually 
fight against us.’ Despite such misgivings, it was not felt practical to refuse. The reason 
given: ‘If we don’t agree, they will go to the German fleet.’37 The purchase of the pre-
dreadnought battleships was not so obviously a British affair, seeing as the ships were 
acquired from another country, but indirectly, it, too, shone a light upon British policy. As 
the British embassy in St Petersburg relayed, while the Russians were not unduly worried 
about the British naval mission when the Turkish navy was weak, if Turkey embarked 
upon serious maritime expansion, ‘the fact that the Young Turkish navy is being organised 
by British admirals will make an unfavourable impression’.38 This caused some soul-
searching in the Foreign Office, but no change of policy. As one official noted: ‘If a 
British Admiral does not organise the Turkish fleet, a German admiral will be called in, 
who will push maters on with greater speed than we should.’ Another minute ran: ‘Turkey 
means to have a fleet whether we assist or not.’ Accordingly, it was essential to ensure that 
‘the Turkish fleet should not become Germanized like the Turkish army’.39
If a certain anxiety existed in London in 1910 that Germany was patiently waiting in 
the wings for an opportunity to take over the reorganization of the Turkish navy and 
thereby supplant British influence there, the events of early 1912 turned this into some-
thing of a paranoia. On 27 January, Sir Edward Goschen, the British ambassador in Berlin, 
forwarded a dispatch to London in which he notified his superiors that it had been reported 
in the German press that when Admiral Hugh Williams completed his term as the techni-
cal adviser to the Turkish navy in April, he would be replaced by a senior German admi-
ral.40 Panic promptly ensued in the Foreign Office. A telegram was immediately sent to 
the British Embassy in Constantinople directing the ambassador to inform the Grand 
Vizier that while ‘His Majesty’s Government hesitate to attach credence to this 
report … they would regard with great gravity such action.’41 At the same time the 
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Admiralty was contacted and advised to proceed immediately to find ‘an officer of energy 
and proved capacity’ to be ready to take over as soon as Williams’s post fell vacant.42 
News was then received from Constantinople that the press article was false and that a 
British admiral was still desired. While this calmed some nerves in the Foreign Office, the 
shock that the original rumour had administered did not go away, and the fact that the 
Admiralty proceeded rather leisurely to nominate a new appointee caused further anxiety 
in relation to Germany. When nothing had been heard from the Admiralty by early March, 
an exasperated Alwyn Parker spoke for many in the Foreign Office when he noted:
The Adm[iral]ty are extremely tiresome in this as in all other matters relating to the Turkish 
fleet … They are simply playing into the hands of Germany … If we do not take care we shall 
have a repetition in regard to the navy of what happened in regard to the army in 1842 [sic], 
when [Helmuth von] Moltke [the elder] replaced major Williams and other British officers sent 
out to reform the Turkish army.
I think we should really impress the Adm[iral]ty at length with the urgency of the question.43
Such concerns, at least, had the desired effect, with Arthur Limpus nominated to 
replace Williams.
This did not prevent the British government from continuing to worry about 
German influence at the Porte. A further spur to such fears was the report sent in by 
Admiral Williams concerning his experiences as naval adviser to the Ottoman gov-
ernment. A constant theme in the memorandum was Williams’s difficulties dealing 
with officials ‘with very strong German proclivities’. On account of this partiality, 
some of these officials were characterized by Williams as ‘very anti-British’ and eager 
to render his ‘position untenable’. The Foreign Office concurred, with one of the 
clerks noting on the report the constant ‘German intrigue against British influence in 
naval matters’.44
Admiral Limpus did not dissent from this analysis. The ‘leaning towards Germany is 
very strong indeed’, he reported less than a year into his posting.45 One of the drivers for 
this was that Germany continued to offer obsolete ships to the Ottoman government for 
sale on favourable terms. It was clear that this was being done not for financial gain but 
with a view to supplanting the Royal Navy in the role of training Turkish officers. Even 
the ambassador noted the obvious point: ‘if the Navy here is to be full of German ships, 
our argument that the officers should be English falls to the ground’.46 Limpus, too, was 
worried and argued that unless Britain responded in kind, at least as far as training was 
concerned, German influence would take over. As he explained:
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I foresee a still further increase in the German element in the Navy: also such a much more 
decided leaning towards Germany that German instructors may be the next step, with little 
chance of retaining English influence in the Turkish navy. The tendency is the stronger since 
certain senior officers here have acquired not only the language but material interests in 
Germany in the past. This letter is too long, so I will not attempt to describe a German controlled 
Turkey. But already in the army, the railways, and kindred concessions, the banks, and in 
commerce generally, the German position is an extremely strong one.
Limpus concluded that strong steps needed to be taken if Britain was not to lose its foot-
hold in the navy.47
The strong measure that Limpus ultimately suggested was to force the resignation of 
the pro-German undersecretary of state for the navy by threatening to withdraw the 
British mission altogether. This was not without risk. As the British ambassador pointed 
out, it could result in the British having to ‘abandon their interest in this country’ and the 
‘possible substitution of a German mission’.48 Interestingly, while sharing Limpus’s frus-
tration, the Admiralty saw no reason to risk such an ultimatum. The logic behind this was 
that they believed that they held a trump card that would ultimately silence German 
intrigue and cement British naval influence. That trump card took the form of the 
Ottoman dreadnoughts being built in Britain. As Sir Henry Jackson the chief of the 
Admiralty War Staff noted: ‘The Vickers-Armstrong contract provides an additional rea-
son for wishing to maintain the British Naval Commission in Turkey, as the combination 
will tend to better resist interference from Germany in Turkish naval administration.’49 
In short, the warships being built in Britain for Turkey – much more modern and power-
ful than the obsolete vessels purchased from Germany – were seen in London as a posi-
tive means of restricting German influence at the Porte. Far from being an anti-Russian 
policy, it was one of which the British might legitimately expect Russia to approve. It is 
to be noted in this respect that whenever Britain did explain that it was acting to forestall 
Germany, as for example over the training of Turkish officers, Sazonov did concur in this 
rationale.50
The desire to limit German influence at the Straits was not the only matter on which 
British and Russian views coincided. Far from being relaxed about the prospect of 
Turkey purchasing South American dreadnoughts, the British government was eager to 
forestall this. Thus, when rumours began to circulate that Brazil intended to dispose of 
the Rio de Janeiro, the British government did not merely sit back like ‘laissez-faire 
Liberals’, to use McMeekin’s phrase, and disclaim any ability to ‘interfere with private 
business contracts’;51 rather the Admiralty attempted, albeit behind the scenes, to 
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influence the outcome. In the first instance, an attempt was made to halt the sale. 
Writing to Lord Rothschild, whose bank was handling the matter for Brazil, Winston 
Churchill, the first lord of the Admiralty, explained that Britain thought the ‘best thing 
would be for the Brazilians not to sell the Rio de Janeiro’. His reason: ‘Difficulties are 
caused when these great weapons are prepared in British yards for the use of foreign 
governments and then turned adrift on the world.’ Accordingly, he made clear that 
Britain ‘strongly deprecate[d] her sale to foreign governments’.52 Unfortunately, this 
none too subtle message failed to have the necessary effect. Hence, once it became 
clear that Brazil was determined to sell, the hostile attitude of the British government 
notwithstanding, Churchill sought to influence it in its choice of purchaser. Another 
letter was duly dispatched to Lord Rothschild, requesting him to inform the Brazilian 
authorities that ‘First Lord of the Admiralty tells me that the new destination of the 
battleship Rio de Janeiro is a matter of concern to the British Admiralty. A sale to 
Greece however w[oul]d be quite unobjectionable to them.’53 The clear implication 
that a sale to the Ottoman government would have been objectionable could hardly 
have been missed. Despite this, it had no effect: the Rio de Janeiro was sold to the 
Porte. Russia’s alarm was noted in the Foreign Office. ‘They may find it difficult to 
believe that H.M. government are powerless in the matter,’ wrote Claud Russell, one 
of the clerks, ‘but such seems to me to be the case.’ Sir Eyre Crowe, the assistant 
undersecretary, concurred. Behind the scenes attempts to discourage the purchase had 
been made, he minuted, ‘with the only result … that the Turkish order was placed, and 
financial arrangements made to meet the cost, without [the British government’s] 
knowledge’.54 This hardly suggests duplicity to Russia.
As this examination of McMeekin’s five Ottoman dreadnoughts hypothesis has 
shown, there are few grounds for attributing the outbreak of the First World War to 
Russian fears of a Turkish naval build-up. While it is true that, under British assistance, 
the Porte was modernizing its maritime forces, the results of this process had been far 
from startling by early 1914, the point at which, according to McMeekin, Russian alarm 
became a decisive factor. As for the size of the Turkish navy, it was certainly not about 
to be augmented by a slew of South American dreadnoughts. Nor did Russia have to 
worry about the reliability of its Entente partner. As the Russian government well knew, 
the British naval mission and British arms supplies were not primarily intended to under-
mine Russia’s position in the Black Sea but to keep the Germans from gaining the com-
manding position at Constantinople that their commerce and military diplomacy might 
otherwise have accorded to them. Given that Russia had objected vociferously when a 
German was put in charge of the army corps garrisoned there, the prospect of a German 
admiral gaining influence over the navy as well would not have been appealing to St 
Petersburg. It certainly held few delights for London. This, rather than accusations of 
perfidious Albion, explains British policy.
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As for Russian policy, doubtless Sazonov wished to halt the shoring up of Ottoman 
power, but nothing that had occurred so far at Constantinople required a rush to war.55 
The expansion of Russian shipbuilding facilities in the Black Sea and a little patience 
would have been a more than adequate response, and both of these would have required 
several more years of peace.56 Russia’s decision in early 1914 to embark upon an expan-
sion of its Black Sea naval shipbuilding programme, a decision that would not bear fruit 
for several years, would indicate that this point was well understood in St Petersburg.57 
In this regard, it is also telling that, when war did come in August 1914, Russia took no 
steps to widen the conflict to include the Ottoman Empire, as might have been expected 
under McMeekin’s thesis. On the contrary, the fact that the fighting did ultimately spread 
to the Black Sea region was because the Ottoman Empire chose to strike against Russia. 
It is also notable that the Turkish leadership embarked upon this campaign not after the 
receipt of a new fleet of dreadnoughts, but after the acquisition of a solitary German 
battlecruiser. These facts place further question marks over McMeekin’s belief that the 
balance of naval power in the Black Sea was decisive in the outbreak of the First World 
War.
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